DCSync
Replication rights pull password hashes from a DC without touching NTDS.dit
categoryIdentity, authentication and credential attacksseverityVery HighdetectabilityHighlabnot yet measured
Detection opportunity what to watch for
A benign emulation of this technique’s linchpin behaviour — the command an attacker runs, and where we’ve detonated it in the lab, exactly what the SIEM saw, what caught it, and what it missed.
What the attacker runs
powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File C:\lab\detonate.ps1 -Technique T1003.006 -Tool atomic -RunId <run-id> -Command 'Invoke-AtomicTest T1003.006 -TestGuids 129efd28-8497-4c87-a1b0-73b9a870ca3e -GetPrereqs; Invoke-AtomicTest T1003.006 -TestGuids 129efd28-8497-4c87-a1b0-73b9a870ca3e -TimeoutSeconds 120'Queued for lab measurement — not yet detonated.
Classification
20 values: 12 reviewed, 7 imported, 1 derived. What do these mean?
Exploitability
| Attack vector | Credential attacks |
|---|---|
| Reach (CVSS) | Network |
| Attack complexity | Low |
| Privileges required | High |
| User interaction | None |
| Attacker skill required | Medium |
| Resources required | Low |
| Likelihood / prevalence | High |
| Maturity | Commoditized |
Impact & scope
| Severity | Very High |
|---|---|
| Impact | Confidentiality |
| Platform | Windows |
| Environment | On-premises |
| Target asset class | Identity |
| Kill-chain phase (tactic) | Credential Access |
Detection & telemetry
| Detectability | High |
|---|---|
| Testability | Atomic Red Team test |
| Data sources (ATT&CK data components) | Active Directory Object AccessActive Directory Object DeletionNetwork Traffic Content |
Detection & response
Mitigated by 16
- M1015 attack-mitigation
- M1026 attack-mitigation
- M1027 attack-mitigation
D3-AEMd3fendD3-ANAAd3fendD3-APCAd3fendD3-CAAd3fendD3-CSPPd3fendD3-NTCDd3fendD3-NTFd3fendD3-NTSAd3fendD3-OPMd3fendD3-PHDURAd3fendD3-PMADd3fendD3-RTSDd3fendD3-UGLPAd3fend
Detected by 8
- DET0594 attack-detection-strategy
060c3ef1-fd0a-4091-bf46-e7d625f60b73sigma06d71506-7beb-4f22-8888-e2e5e2ca7fd8sigma17d619c1-e020-4347-957e-1d1207455c93sigma4976aa50-8f41-45c6-8b15-ab3fc10e79edsigma611eab06-a145-4dfa-a295-3ccc5c20f59asigmaa642964e-bead-4bed-8910-1bb4d63e3b4dsigmaf0d1feba-4344-4ca9-8121-a6c97bd6df52sigma
Tested by 2
129efd28-8497-4c87-a1b0-73b9a870ca3eatomica0bced08-3fc5-4d8b-93b7-e8344739376eatomic
Attack relationships
- Parent: Credential-dumping tooling
Framework references
- Primary source: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
- attack: T1003.006 (primary)
Evidence & sources
- ev-0001 (Cyber Attack Taxonomy) — Name, definition and Example/ID taken verbatim from the 'Identity, authentication and credential attacks' table, line 328 of Cyber-Attack-Taxonomy.md
- ev-0002 (MITRE Enterprise ATT&CK v19.2 (STIX 2.1)) — ATT&CK usage prevalence: 8 groups/software/campaigns reference this technique (ATT&CK enterprise v19.2)