Diamond Ticket
A legitimate TGT decrypted, its PAC edited, then re-encrypted with the KRBTGT key
categoryIdentity, authentication and credential attacksseverityVery HighdetectabilityLowlabnot yet measured
Example: Rubeus
Detection opportunity what to watch for
A benign emulation of this technique’s linchpin behaviour — the command an attacker runs, and where we’ve detonated it in the lab, exactly what the SIEM saw, what caught it, and what it missed.
What the attacker runs
powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File C:\lab\detonate.ps1 -Technique T1558.001 -Tool atomic -RunId <run-id> -Command 'Invoke-AtomicTest T1558.001 -TestGuids e42d33cd-205c-4acf-ab59-a9f38f6bad9c -GetPrereqs; Invoke-AtomicTest T1558.001 -TestGuids e42d33cd-205c-4acf-ab59-a9f38f6bad9c -TimeoutSeconds 120'Queued for lab measurement — not yet detonated.
Classification
22 values: 13 reviewed, 8 imported, 1 derived. What do these mean?
Exploitability
| Attack vector | Credential attacks |
|---|---|
| Reach (CVSS) | Network |
| Attack complexity | High |
| Privileges required | High |
| User interaction | None |
| Attacker skill required | High |
| Resources required | Low |
| Likelihood / prevalence | Low |
| Maturity | Established |
Impact & scope
| Severity | Very High |
|---|---|
| Impact | ConfidentialityIntegrity |
| Platform | Windows |
| Environment | On-premises |
| Target asset class | Identity |
| Kill-chain phase (tactic) | Credential Access |
Detection & telemetry
| Detectability | Low |
|---|---|
| Testability | Atomic Red Team test |
| Data sources (ATT&CK data components) | Active Directory Credential RequestProcess Access |
| Attack permissions (ATT&CK) | User |
Detection & response
Mitigated by 13
- M1015 attack-mitigation
- M1026 attack-mitigation
D3-ANCId3fendD3-CCSAd3fendD3-CHd3fendD3-CRd3fendD3-CROd3fendD3-CTSd3fendD3-DUCd3fendD3-MFAd3fendD3-RICd3fendD3-TBd3fendD3-TBAd3fend
Detected by 2
- DET0144 attack-detection-strategy
9c5d2b84-1f7e-4a3c-d6b8-e04f9a17c523sigma
Tested by 2
9726592a-dabc-4d4d-81cd-44070008b3afatomice42d33cd-205c-4acf-ab59-a9f38f6bad9catomic
Attack relationships
- Parent: Constrained delegation / S4U abuse
- Parent: Resource-based constrained delegation (RBCD)
- Parent: Unconstrained delegation abuse
Framework references
- Primary source: https://www.semperis.com/blog/a-diamond-ticket-in-the-ruff/
- attack: T1558.001 (primary)
Evidence & sources
- ev-0001 (Cyber Attack Taxonomy) — Name, definition and Example/ID taken verbatim from the 'Identity, authentication and credential attacks' table, line 326 of Cyber-Attack-Taxonomy.md
- ev-0002 (MITRE Enterprise ATT&CK v19.2 (STIX 2.1)) — ATT&CK usage prevalence: 5 groups/software/campaigns reference this technique (ATT&CK enterprise v19.2)