Mirai-style IoT botnet
Worm brute-forces telnet defaults to enslave cameras and routers
categoryWireless, mobile, IoT and OT/ICS attacksseverityHighdetectabilityNonelabnot yet measured
Example: Dyn/Krebs/OVH (2016), 1 Tbps+
Classification
18 values: 6 imported, 2 derived, 10 machine-classified. What do these mean?
Exploitability
| Attack vector | MalwareWireless, mobile & IoT/OT |
|---|---|
| Reach (CVSS) | Network |
| Attack complexity | Low |
| Privileges required | None |
| User interaction | None |
| Attacker skill required | Low |
| Resources required | Low |
| Likelihood / prevalence | Medium |
| Maturity | Commoditized |
Impact & scope
| Severity | High |
|---|---|
| Impact | Availability |
| Platform | PRE |
| Environment | Edge / IoT |
| Target asset class | EndpointNetwork device |
| Kill-chain phase (tactic) | Resource Development |
Detection & telemetry
| Detectability | None |
|---|
Detection & response
Mitigated by 1
- M1056 attack-mitigation
Detected by 1
- DET0883 attack-detection-strategy
Framework references
- Primary source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mirai_(malware)
- capec: CAPEC-70 (primary)
- attack: T1584.005
Evidence & sources
- ev-0001 (Cyber Attack Taxonomy) — Name, definition and Example/ID taken verbatim from the 'Wireless, mobile, IoT and OT/ICS attacks' table, line 492 of Cyber-Attack-Taxonomy.md
- ev-0002 (Seeded-record enrichment run 2026-09-30 (crosswalk + facet classification)) — Crosswalk to capec:CAPEC-70, attack:T1584.005 as the nearest framework entries; ids verified to exist in the cached catalogues.
- ev-0003 (CAPEC — Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification 3.9) — CAPEC-70 Try Common or Default Usernames and Passwords: CAPEC prerequisites for this pattern
The system uses one factor password based authentication.The adversary has the means to interact with the system.
- ev-0004 (MITRE Enterprise ATT&CK v19.2 (STIX 2.1)) — ATT&CK usage prevalence: 6 groups/software/campaigns reference this technique (ATT&CK enterprise v19.2)