Silver Ticket
Forged service ticket with a service account hash, no DC needed
categoryIdentity, authentication and credential attacksseverityHighdetectabilityLowlabnot yet measured
Detection opportunity what to watch for
A benign emulation of this technique’s linchpin behaviour — the command an attacker runs, and where we’ve detonated it in the lab, exactly what the SIEM saw, what caught it, and what it missed.
What the attacker runs
powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File C:\lab\detonate.ps1 -Technique T1558.002 -Tool atomic -RunId <run-id> -Command 'Invoke-AtomicTest T1558.002 -TestGuids 385e59aa-113e-4711-84d9-f637aef01f2c -GetPrereqs; Invoke-AtomicTest T1558.002 -TestGuids 385e59aa-113e-4711-84d9-f637aef01f2c -TimeoutSeconds 120'Queued for lab measurement — not yet detonated.
Classification
22 values: 13 reviewed, 8 imported, 1 derived. What do these mean?
Exploitability
| Attack vector | Credential attacks |
|---|---|
| Reach (CVSS) | Network |
| Attack complexity | Low |
| Privileges required | Low |
| User interaction | None |
| Attacker skill required | Medium |
| Resources required | Low |
| Likelihood / prevalence | Medium |
| Maturity | Commoditized |
Impact & scope
| Severity | High |
|---|---|
| Impact | ConfidentialityIntegrity |
| Platform | Windows |
| Environment | On-premises |
| Target asset class | Identity |
| Kill-chain phase (tactic) | Credential Access |
Detection & telemetry
| Detectability | Low |
|---|---|
| Testability | Atomic Red Team test |
| Data sources (ATT&CK data components) | Active Directory Credential RequestProcess Access |
| Attack permissions (ATT&CK) | User |
Detection & response
Mitigated by 14
- M1026 attack-mitigation
- M1027 attack-mitigation
- M1041 attack-mitigation
D3-ANCId3fendD3-CCSAd3fendD3-CHd3fendD3-CRd3fendD3-CROd3fendD3-CTSd3fendD3-DUCd3fendD3-MFAd3fendD3-RICd3fendD3-TBd3fendD3-TBAd3fend
Detected by 2
- DET0241 attack-detection-strategy
b2e4a719-3c8f-4d1b-a507-f83c2d56e901sigma
Tested by 1
385e59aa-113e-4711-84d9-f637aef01f2catomic
Attack relationships
- Parent: Constrained delegation / S4U abuse
- Parent: Resource-based constrained delegation (RBCD)
- Parent: Unconstrained delegation abuse
Framework references
- Primary source: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/
- attack: T1558.002 (primary)
Evidence & sources
- ev-0001 (Cyber Attack Taxonomy) — Name, definition and Example/ID taken verbatim from the 'Identity, authentication and credential attacks' table, line 325 of Cyber-Attack-Taxonomy.md
- ev-0002 (MITRE Enterprise ATT&CK v19.2 (STIX 2.1)) — ATT&CK usage prevalence: 4 groups/software/campaigns reference this technique (ATT&CK enterprise v19.2)