SecureAEye LAB ONLINE · SIG 657 · DET ~41s

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UEFI / system-firmware implant

Malicious BIOS/UEFI module that survives OS reinstall

categoryMalwareseverityHighdetectabilityLowlabnot yet measured

Example: LoJax, CosmicStrand

Detection opportunity what to watch for

A benign emulation of this technique’s linchpin behaviour — the command an attacker runs, and where we’ve detonated it in the lab, exactly what the SIEM saw, what caught it, and what it missed.

What the attacker runs

ATT&CK T1542.001 · UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation · Atomic Red Team
powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File C:\lab\detonate.ps1 -Technique T1542.001 -Tool atomic -RunId <run-id> -Command 'Invoke-AtomicTest T1542.001 -TestGuids b8a49f03-e3c4-40f2-b7bb-9e8f8fdddbf1 -TimeoutSeconds 120'

Queued for lab measurement — not yet detonated.

Classification

31 values: 13 reviewed, 14 imported, 4 derived. What do these mean?

Exploitability

Attack vectorMalware
Reach (CVSS)Local
Attack complexityHigh
Privileges requiredHigh
User interactionNone
Attacker skill requiredHigh
Resources requiredHigh
Likelihood / prevalenceLow
MaturityEstablished

Impact & scope

SeverityHigh
ImpactAvailabilityConfidentialityIntegrity
PlatformNetwork DevicesWindows
EnvironmentOn-premises
Target asset classEndpointPhysicalServer
Kill-chain phase (tactic)PersistenceStealth

Detection & telemetry

DetectabilityLow
TestabilityAtomic Red Team test
Data sources (ATT&CK data components)Drive AccessDrive ModificationFile CreationFirmware ModificationProcess Creation
Defense bypassedAnti-virusFile monitoringHost intrusion prevention

Detection & response

Mitigated by 11

  • M1026 attack-mitigation
  • M1046 attack-mitigation
  • M1051 attack-mitigation
  • D3-AVE d3fend
  • D3-FBA d3fend
  • D3-FEMC d3fend
  • D3-FV d3fend
  • D3-RS d3fend
  • D3-SFV d3fend
  • D3-SU d3fend
  • D3-SWI d3fend

Detected by 3

  • DET0099 attack-detection-strategy
  • 4abc0ec4-db5a-412f-9632-26659cddf145 sigma
  • e94b9ddc-eec5-4bb8-8a58-b9dc5f4e185f sigma

Tested by 1

  • b8a49f03-e3c4-40f2-b7bb-9e8f8fdddbf1 atomic

Framework references

Evidence & sources

  • ev-0001 (Cyber Attack Taxonomy) — Name, definition and Example/ID taken verbatim from the 'Malware' table, line 83 of Cyber-Attack-Taxonomy.md
  • ev-0002 (MITRE Enterprise ATT&CK v19.2 (STIX 2.1)) — ATT&CK usage prevalence: 3 groups/software/campaigns reference this technique (ATT&CK enterprise v19.2)