Adversary-in-the-middle phishing kits
Reverse-proxy phishing (Evilginx, EvilProxy, Tycoon 2FA) relays credentials and captures session cookies
categoryIdentity, authentication and credential attacksseverityHighdetectabilityHighlabnot yet measured
Example: Tycoon 2FA hits 500k orgs/month
Classification
40 values: 10 reviewed, 21 imported, 9 derived. What do these mean?
Exploitability
| Attack vector | Credential attacksNetwork attacks |
|---|---|
| Reach (CVSS) | |
| Attack complexity | Low |
| Privileges required | None |
| User interaction | Active |
| Attacker skill required | High |
| Resources required | Low |
| Likelihood / prevalence | High |
| Maturity | Commoditized |
Impact & scope
| Severity | High |
|---|---|
| Impact | ConfidentialityIntegrity |
| Platform | LinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows |
| Environment | CloudMobileOn-premises |
| Target asset class | HumanIdentity |
| Kill-chain phase (tactic) | CollectionCredential Access |
Detection & telemetry
| Detectability | High |
|---|---|
| Testability | Atomic Red Team test |
| Data sources (ATT&CK data components) | Application Log ContentFile AccessFile ModificationLogon Session CreationNetwork Connection CreationNetwork Traffic ContentNetwork Traffic FlowProcess AccessProcess CreationUser Account AuthenticationWindows Registry Key Modification |
Detection & response
Mitigated by 31
- M1017 attack-mitigation
- M1021 attack-mitigation
- M1030 attack-mitigation
- M1031 attack-mitigation
- M1032 attack-mitigation
- M1035 attack-mitigation
- M1037 attack-mitigation
- M1041 attack-mitigation
- M1042 attack-mitigation
- M1047 attack-mitigation
- M1051 attack-mitigation
- M1054 attack-mitigation
D3-ANCId3fendD3-APCAd3fendD3-CAAd3fendD3-CCSAd3fendD3-CHd3fendD3-CRd3fendD3-CROd3fendD3-CSPPd3fendD3-CTSd3fendD3-DUCd3fendD3-MFAd3fendD3-NTCDd3fendD3-NTFd3fendD3-NTSAd3fendD3-PHDURAd3fendD3-PMADd3fendD3-RICd3fendD3-RTSDd3fendD3-UGLPAd3fend
Detected by 25
- DET0296 attack-detection-strategy
- DET0509 attack-detection-strategy
0ed99dda-6a35-11ef-8c99-0242ac120002sigma16f5d8ca-44bd-47c8-acbe-6fc95a16c12fsigma2074e137-1b73-4e2d-88ba-5a3407dbdce0sigma24c77512-782b-448a-8950-eddb0785fc71sigma3b8f4c92-6a51-4d7e-9c3a-8e2d1f5a7b09sigma4096842a-8f9f-4d36-92b4-d0b2a62f9b2asigma4627c6ae-6899-46e2-aa0c-6ebcb1becd19sigma4833155a-4053-4c9c-a997-777fcea0baa7sigma50e606bf-04ce-4ca7-9d54-3449494bbd4bsigma5588576c-5898-4fac-bcdd-7475a60e8f43sigma5589ab4f-a767-433c-961d-c91f3f704db1sigma56fa3cd6-f8d6-4520-a8c7-607292971886sigma679085d5-f427-4484-9f58-1dc30a7c426dsigmaa557ffe6-ac54-43d2-ae69-158027082350sigmaa7c0ae48-8df8-42bf-91bd-2ea57e2f9d43sigmab07e58cf-cacc-4135-8473-ccb2eba63dd2sigmabb0e87ce-c89f-4857-84fa-095e4483e9cbsigmabc2e25ed-b92b-4daa-b074-b502bdd1982bsigmac2c76b77-32be-4d1f-82c9-7e544bdfe0ebsigmacd8c163e-a19b-402e-bdd5-419ff5859f12sigmad22df9cd-2aee-4089-93c7-9dc4eae77f2csigmae7a21b5f-d8c4-4ae5-b8d9-93c5d3f28e1csigmaea1a07f0-3dac-47a2-aeb4-86f5379ba2b4sigma
Tested by 6
26a6b840-4943-4965-8df5-ef1f9a282440atomic4b437357-f4e9-4c84-9fa6-9bcee6f826aaatomicb647f4ee-88de-40ac-9419-f17fac9489a7atomicdeecd55f-afe0-4a62-9fba-4d1ba2deb321atomice43cfdaf-3fb8-4a45-8de0-7eee8741d072atomice57ba07b-3a33-40cd-a892-748273b9b49aatomic
Attack relationships
- Child: ARP spoofing / poisoning
- Child: DHCP starvation
- Child: Evil twin AP
- Child: LLMNR / NBT-NS / mDNS poisoning
- Child: NTLM relay / name-resolution poisoning
- Child: Rogue DHCP / DHCP spoofing
- Child: SMB / NTLM relay
Framework references
- Primary source: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/05/29/defending-against-evolving-identity-attack-techniques/
- attack: T1557 (primary)
- attack: T1539
Evidence & sources
- ev-0001 (Cyber Attack Taxonomy) — Name, definition and Example/ID taken verbatim from the 'Identity, authentication and credential attacks' table, line 346 of Cyber-Attack-Taxonomy.md
- ev-0002 (MITRE Enterprise ATT&CK v19.2 (STIX 2.1)) — ATT&CK usage prevalence: 29 groups/software/campaigns reference this technique (ATT&CK enterprise v19.2)
- ev-0003 (MITRE Enterprise ATT&CK v19.2 (STIX 2.1)) — ATT&CK usage prevalence: 9 groups/software/campaigns reference this technique (ATT&CK enterprise v19.2)