Phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS)
Rented AiTM kits proxy logins to steal credentials and session tokens
categoryPhysical, insider and cross-cutting attacksseverityHighdetectabilityHighlabnot yet measured
Example: Tycoon 2FA, 500k orgs/month
Classification
34 values: 19 imported, 2 derived, 13 machine-classified. What do these mean?
Exploitability
| Attack vector | Network attacks |
|---|---|
| Reach (CVSS) | |
| Attack complexity | Low |
| Privileges required | None |
| User interaction | Active |
| Attacker skill required | Low |
| Resources required | Low |
| Likelihood / prevalence | High |
| Maturity | Commoditized |
Impact & scope
| Severity | High |
|---|---|
| Impact | Confidentiality |
| Platform | Identity ProviderLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesOffice SuiteSaaSWindows |
| Environment | Cloud |
| Target asset class | HumanIdentity |
| Kill-chain phase (tactic) | CollectionCredential AccessInitial Access |
Detection & telemetry
| Detectability | High |
|---|---|
| Testability | Atomic Red Team test |
| Data sources (ATT&CK data components) | Application Log ContentFile ModificationNetwork Connection CreationNetwork Traffic ContentNetwork Traffic FlowProcess CreationWindows Registry Key Modification |
Detection & response
Mitigated by 46
- M1017 attack-mitigation
- M1018 attack-mitigation
- M1021 attack-mitigation
- M1030 attack-mitigation
- M1031 attack-mitigation
- M1035 attack-mitigation
- M1037 attack-mitigation
- M1041 attack-mitigation
- M1042 attack-mitigation
- M1047 attack-mitigation
- M1054 attack-mitigation
D3-APCAd3fendD3-CAAd3fendD3-CFd3fendD3-CMd3fendD3-CQd3fendD3-CSPPd3fendD3-DAd3fendD3-DFd3fendD3-DId3fendD3-EFd3fendD3-EFAd3fendD3-ERd3fendD3-FAd3fendD3-FEd3fendD3-FEVd3fendD3-FIMd3fendD3-HDd3fendD3-IAAd3fendD3-ISVAd3fendD3-ITFd3fendD3-LFPd3fendD3-NTCDd3fendD3-NTFd3fendD3-NTSAd3fendD3-PHDURAd3fendD3-PMADd3fendD3-REd3fendD3-RFd3fendD3-RFAMd3fend- … and 6 more in the database
Detected by 27
- DET0107 attack-detection-strategy
- DET0296 attack-detection-strategy
0ed99dda-6a35-11ef-8c99-0242ac120002sigma16f5d8ca-44bd-47c8-acbe-6fc95a16c12fsigma2074e137-1b73-4e2d-88ba-5a3407dbdce0sigma3569aefd-e535-4391-8c18-24bd01a21eafsigma38e7f511-3f74-41d4-836e-f57dfa18eeadsigma3b8f4c92-6a51-4d7e-9c3a-8e2d1f5a7b09sigma4096842a-8f9f-4d36-92b4-d0b2a62f9b2asigma4627c6ae-6899-46e2-aa0c-6ebcb1becd19sigma50e606bf-04ce-4ca7-9d54-3449494bbd4bsigma5588576c-5898-4fac-bcdd-7475a60e8f43sigma5589ab4f-a767-433c-961d-c91f3f704db1sigma56fa3cd6-f8d6-4520-a8c7-607292971886sigma679085d5-f427-4484-9f58-1dc30a7c426dsigma6e4dcdd1-e48b-42f7-b2d8-3b413fc58cb4sigmaa557ffe6-ac54-43d2-ae69-158027082350sigmaa7c0ae48-8df8-42bf-91bd-2ea57e2f9d43sigmab07e58cf-cacc-4135-8473-ccb2eba63dd2sigmabb0e87ce-c89f-4857-84fa-095e4483e9cbsigmabc2e25ed-b92b-4daa-b074-b502bdd1982bsigmac2c76b77-32be-4d1f-82c9-7e544bdfe0ebsigmacd8c163e-a19b-402e-bdd5-419ff5859f12sigmad22df9cd-2aee-4089-93c7-9dc4eae77f2csigmae0e121d0-be4d-4281-af7e-17abbba4a408sigmae7a21b5f-d8c4-4ae5-b8d9-93c5d3f28e1csigmaea1a07f0-3dac-47a2-aeb4-86f5379ba2b4sigma
Tested by 2
bc177ef9-6a12-4ebc-a2ec-d41e19c2791datomicdeecd55f-afe0-4a62-9fba-4d1ba2deb321atomic
Attack relationships
- Child: ARP spoofing / poisoning
- Child: DHCP starvation
- Child: Evil twin AP
- Child: LLMNR / NBT-NS / mDNS poisoning
- Child: NTLM relay / name-resolution poisoning
- Child: Rogue DHCP / DHCP spoofing
- Child: SMB / NTLM relay
- Parent: BEC: data theft (W-2/PII)
- Parent: Device-code phishing
- Parent: Phishing
- Parent: Whaling
Framework references
- Primary source: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/03/04/inside-tycoon2fa-how-a-leading-aitm-phishing-kit-operated-at-scale/
- attack: T1566.002 (primary)
- attack: T1557
Evidence & sources
- ev-0001 (Cyber Attack Taxonomy) — Name, definition and Example/ID taken verbatim from the 'Physical, insider and cross-cutting attacks' table, line 708 of Cyber-Attack-Taxonomy.md
- ev-0002 (Seeded-record enrichment run 2026-09-30 (crosswalk + facet classification)) — Crosswalk to attack:T1566.002, attack:T1557 as the nearest framework entries; ids verified to exist in the cached catalogues.
- ev-0003 (MITRE Enterprise ATT&CK v19.2 (STIX 2.1)) — ATT&CK usage prevalence: 86 groups/software/campaigns reference this technique (ATT&CK enterprise v19.2)
- ev-0004 (MITRE Enterprise ATT&CK v19.2 (STIX 2.1)) — ATT&CK usage prevalence: 9 groups/software/campaigns reference this technique (ATT&CK enterprise v19.2)